Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil Rights Claims: Must They Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e Before Filing a Claim in Federal Court? by Sullivan, Tracy M.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 8 Symposium on Intellectual Property, Digital Technology & Electronic Commerce 
January 2002 
Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil Rights Claims: Must 
They Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e Before 
Filing a Claim in Federal Court? 
Tracy M. Sullivan 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tracy M. Sullivan, Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil Rights Claims: Must They Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e Before Filing a Claim in Federal Court?, 8 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 
419 (2002), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/16 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 









Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil Rights 
Claims: Must They Exhaust Administrative  
Remedies Under § 1997e Before Filing a  
Claim in Federal Court? 
Tracy M. Sullivan* 
Consider two prisoners similarly situated: Wyatt and Whitley.1 
Wyatt is incarcerated in Ohio and Whitley is incarcerated in Texas. 
Both men file a civil rights action against prison employees seeking 
damages for violation of the Eighth Amendment.2 Wyatt files his 
claim in a federal district court in Ohio seeking monetary damages. 
Whitley files his claim in a federal district court in Texas seeking 
monetary damages as well. Neither man pursued relief through his 
prison’s administrative grievance procedure before filing his claim.3 
Neither prison offers a monetary remedy among the possible reliefs 
to prisoners with successful claims. The court will require Wyatt to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal 
court,4 while Whitley’s claim will continue. Wyatt and Whitley are 
similarly situated, yet one federal court will hear Whitley’s case, 
while another federal court will dismiss Wyatt’s case. This 
incongruity is a result of divergent interpretations of a statute 
imposing a requirement on prisoners to exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before filing their civil rights claims in 
federal court. 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2001.  
 1. The prisoners’ situations in this introduction are loosely based on Wyatt v. Leonard, 
193 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1999) and Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998). These cases are 
discussed in Part III of this Note. 
 2. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
 3. In the actual case, Wyatt attempted to bring his matter to the attention of the 
appropriate official. Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 880. The court found that, by doing so, he “substantially 
complied with the exhaustion requirement.” Id.  
 4. Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878.  
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Section 1997e of Title 42 of the U.S. Code5 currently imposes a 
mandatory exhaustion requirement on prisoners who file civil rights 
lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 A 1996 amendment to § 1997e 
inserted a mandatory exhaustion provision used today and spurred 
debate over whether prisoners who file civil rights lawsuits seeking 
only monetary relief are required to exhaust their administrative 
remedies.7 This debate involving various interpretations of § 1997e, 
resulted in a circuit split. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that § 1997e applies even when prisoners seek 
monetary damages.8 The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits found that 
§ 1997e is not applicable when prisoners seek monetary damages.9 
This Note supports the holding of the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits: Mandatory exhaustion, regardless of the remedy 
sought, serves important purposes, conforms with the goals of the 
statute, and does not preclude prisoners from pursuing their claims in 
federal court. Thus, courts should apply this rule without exception. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1996.10 Part II discusses the effect of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act on 42 U.S.C. § 1997e’s directive for 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996). Part of this statute’s text reads:  
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies  
 No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 
Id. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. II 1996) states in part:  
Civil action for deprivation of rights 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against 
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable.  
 7. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1121 (1996).  
 8. See infra notes 65-114 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 36-64 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-27. 
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exhaustion of administrative remedies. Part III reviews the case law 
interpreting § 1997e as it applies to prisoners’ civil rights lawsuits 
and their requests for monetary relief. Finally, Part IV analyzes case 
law and the courts’ struggle with competing goals and proposes that 
the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies should 
remain intact despite the prisoners’ request for monetary relief. 
I. HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
Prisoners often seek to remedy alleged violations of their civil 
rights through the judicial system by filing lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 or as Bivens claims.11 Many of these civil rights lawsuits have 
“revealed the substandard, often cruel and disgusting, nature of some 
prison facilities.”12 Despite legitimate claims, “federal and state 
courts have suffered a barrage of trivial and even ridiculous civil suits 
filed by prisoners complaining of ‘unconstitutional’ prison 
conditions.”13 In fact, with the increase in the prison population over 
the years, lawsuits filed by prisoners nearly tripled in number 
between 1980 and 1996.14 Prisoner lawsuits constitute a significant 
percentage of suits filed in federal courts.15 Of the prisoner petitions 
 
 11. A Bivens claim is named after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Howard Jay Pollack, In the Right Place at the 
Wrong Time: Should Federal Prisoners Be Required to Exhaust Their Administrative Remedies 
Prior to Bringing a Bivens-Type Claim in Federal Court?, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 241, 241 n.2 
(1991). 
[Bivens] established that victims of constitutional violations sustained at the hands of 
federal officers have recourse for damages in federal court despite the absence of any 
statute specifically conferring such a right. Bivens is particularly significant because 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) does not provide a private cause of action against federal 
officials for constitutional violations. That statute only provides remedy for 
constitutional torts committed “under color of state law.” 
Id. 
 12. Kristin L. Burns, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 
GA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1997). 
 13. Id. at 881. 
 14. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 
1980-96 5 (1997). In 1980, 319,598 people were held in federal and state prisons. Id. By 1995, 
the prison population had grown to 1,078,545. During 1980, 23,230 federal and state inmates 
filed prisoner petitions in U.S. district courts. Id. In 1996, this number increased to 68,235 
prisoner petitions. Id. at iii.  
 15. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998). “Indeed, by 1995 more 
than twenty-five percent of the suits filed in federal district court were brought by 
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filed in the federal courts, more than half allege civil rights 
violations.16 
In hopes of easing the burden of prisoners’ suits on the judicial 
system, President Bill Clinton signed the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA) into law on April 26, 199617 to amend 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 
and other statutes.18 
The history associated with the enactment of the PLRA19 shows 
that judges, legal scholars, and practitioners20 grew angry and 
 
prisoners.” Id. 
 16. SCALIA, supra note 14, at 1.  
 17. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The 
PLRA “was passed as Title VIII of the statute making fiscal 1996 appropriations for the 
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State; the judiciary; and related agencies.” FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION WITH 
SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 1 (1996). 
 18. “The PLRA sets forth several provisions affecting the ability of prisoners to complain 
about prison conditions as well as the ability of federal judges to relieve conditions that violate 
prisoners’ federal rights.” Burns, supra note 12, at 882. In addition to amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e, the PLRA amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1346(b); and 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a). FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 1. “The Act adds provisions, including 
new sections 1915A and 1932, to title 28 of the U.S. Code and also generally changes the word 
‘he’ to ‘the prisoner.’” Id. 
The pre-PLRA version of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e reads: 
Exhaustion of remedies 
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to 
section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison 
or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a 
requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice, continue such case 
for a period of not [sic] to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such 
plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available. 
 (2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not be 
required unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that 
such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum 
acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are 
otherwise fair and effective. 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994). 
 19. “Congress . . . did little to provide a comprehensive historical background for the 
PLRA; the Act itself was part of an omnibus appropriations bill, and its history consists of only 
one hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, one substantive House Report, and a few 
days’ worth of floor debate.” Burns, supra note 12, at 886-87. 
 20. Representatives for the Inmate Litigation Task Force of the National Association of 
Attorneys General (NAAG) wrote Senator Dole to express the organization’s “strong support” 
for the PLRA: “We thank you for recognizing the importance of federal legislation to curb the 
epidemic of frivolous inmate litigation that is plaguing this country.” 141 CONG. REC. 19, 
26552-53 (1995); letter was signed by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, 
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concerned over the increasing numbers of prisoner civil rights 
lawsuits filed in federal court and “the high rate of frivolous and 
abusive lawsuits by inmates.”21 Proponents of the PLRA regarded 
many of the prisoner civil rights lawsuits as wasting judicial 
resources and depriving others of quality justice.22 In response to the 
“alarming explosion in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State 
and Federal Prisoners,”23 Senator Bob Dole introduced the PLRA to 
the Senate in September 1995.24 Senator Dole enumerated examples 
of frivolous lawsuits that clog the judicial system.25 Senator Jon Kyl 
also spoke in support of the PLRA by explaining the burden of 
prisoners’ lawsuits.26 
Following the introduction, Senator Joseph Biden criticized the 
PLRA by recounting examples of how administrative remedies did 
 
Chair; Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California; Grant Woods, Attorney General of 
Arizona; Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri. Id. (reprinted in 19, 26553-53 
(1995)). 
 21. Burns, supra note 12, at 889. 
 22. 141 CONG. REC. 19, 26548 (1995). 
Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, 
and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. The time and money 
spent defending these cases are clearly time and money better spent prosecuting 
violent criminals, fighting illegal drugs, or cracking down on consumer fraud.  
Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Senators Orrin Hatch, Jon Kyl, Spencer Abraham, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Harry Reid, 
Strom Thurmond, Arlen Specter, Rick Santorum, Alfonse D’Amato, Phil Gramm, and 
Christopher Bond joined Senator Dole in introducing the PLRA. Id. Later in 1995, Senators 
Hank Brown and John McCain joined as co-sponsors of the bill. 141 CONG. REC. 22, 31696 
(1995); 141 CONG. REC. 24, 35288 (1995). 
 25. 141 CONG. REC. 19, 26548 (1995). 
These suits can involve such grievances as insufficient storage locker space, a 
defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner 
to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, and yes, being served chunky peanut 
butter instead of the creamy variety. The list goes on and on.  
Id. 
 26. 141 CONG. REC. 19, 26553 (1995). Senator Kyl remarked: 
Many people think of prison inmates as spending their free time in the weight room or 
the television lounge. But the most crowded place in today’s prisons may be the law 
library . . . . These prisoners are victimizing society twice—first when they commit the 
crime that put them in prison, and second when they waste our hard-earned tax dollars 
while cases based on serious grievances languish on the court calendar.  
Id. 
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not sufficiently resolve civil rights complaints.27 This amendment and 
debate over its enactment raised questions as to the applicability of 
the exhaustion requirements when prisoners seek monetary relief for 
their civil rights claims. 
II. THE EFFECT OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT ON 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e’S DIRECTIVE ON EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 
The PLRA requires that even if a prison facility’s grievance 
procedures are not certified,28 an inmate must exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action in federal 
court.29 The revised 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and (b) codified this 
provision of the PLRA.30  
 
 27. 141 CONG. REC. 19, 22044 (1995). Sen. Biden remarked: 
In one case, for example, children in a severely overcrowded juvenile detention center 
in Pennsylvania—a facility that was at 160 percent of capacity—were beaten by 
staff—sometimes with chains and other objects. These problems were not resolved 
until a court order was entered . . . [Santiago v. Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977)].  
 In a recent case right here in the District of Columbia, Judge June L. Green found 
that correctional officers had routinely sexually assaulted women prisoners—one had 
raped a woman prisoner, another had forced a prisoner to perform oral sex. When 
these conditions were reported to the D.C. correction officials, nothing was done. It 
was when the court entered an order that the district take steps to prevent these 
incidents from recurring that the prisoners were able to get relief. [Women Prisoners of 
Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 
1995)].  
Id. 
 28. The Department of Justice and local federal courts are entities that could certify the 
prison’s grievance procedures. SCALIA, supra note 14, at 15. 
 29. SCALIA, supra note 14, at 15. The PLRA changed other aspects of prisoner lawsuits:  
Frivolous, malicious, ill-founded suits could be dismissed without requiring exhaustion 
of administrative remedies; attorney fees were limited; an inmate seeking to proceed in 
forma pauperis (without funds, and therefore excused from paying filing fees or other 
court fees) would have to submit records showing the lack of funds in his prison 
account in order to avoid payment of fees; court orders for relief from prison 
conditions were strictly limited, to correct only the violation of rights shown by the 
particular plaintiff-inmate; consent decrees were limited in the scope of relief that 
could be ordered; and the use and authority of special masters in prison cases were 
limited. 
CLAIR A. CRIPE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT 80 (1997). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)-(b) (Supp. II 1996). 
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Previously, the § 1997e gave courts discretion in choosing 
whether to require prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies.31 
Additionally, the previous version only allowed courts to require the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies if either the Attorney General 
certified that the administrative remedies used met acceptable 
standards or if the court found an uncertified grievance system to 
“comply substantially” with the minimum acceptable standards 
promulgated under the previous version of § 1997e(b).32 With the 
current, post-PLRA version of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, courts “no longer 
have the option to stay actions while prisoners exhaust such 
remedies, and there is no longer any requirement that either the 
Attorney General certify or the court find that those administrative 
remedies are acceptable.”33 The Department of Justice developed 
minimum standards to “guide development of certifiable grievance 
procedures,”34 which are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR).35 
III. CASE LAW INTERPRETING § 1997e’S REQUIREMENT FOR 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AS IT APPLIES  
TO PRISONERS’ REQUEST FOR MONETARY RELIEF  
IN THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS LAWSUITS 
Even where states and penal institutions have a grievance 
procedure in place, some prisoners argue that they are exempt from 
the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e because they seek 
monetary relief, which often is not among the remedies available 
from the prison grievance system. The circuit courts are divided over 
the question of whether a prisoner seeking only monetary damages 
 
 31. Id. § 1997e. 
 32. Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners Under 
Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935, 938-39 (1986). 
 33. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 34. 
 34. Lay, supra note 32, at 939-40. 
 35. Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 40 (1999). The minimum 
standards for remedies are that “[t]he grievance procedure shall afford a successful grievant a 
meaningful remedy. Although available remedies may vary among institutions, a reasonable 
range of meaningful remedies in each institution is necessary.” Id. § 40.6. Yet, “[t]o determine 
the available administrative remedies, courts should consult the state statutes and regulations 
applicable to the prisoner litigant.” FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 36. 
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must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil rights 
action in federal court. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held that 
§ 1997e does not apply when the prisoner seeks only monetary relief. 
In contrast, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found 
that § 1997e applies even when the prisoner seeks only monetary 
relief.  
A. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits: Exhaustion is Not Required 
When Prisoners Seek Only Monetary Damages and the Prison 
System Offers No Monetary Remedies 
One of the first cases to address this issue was Garrett v. Hawk, 
which held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was not 
required because the prisoner-plaintiff requested monetary relief.36 
Garrett filed a complaint against Hawk, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, and at least thirty correctional officers employed 
by the penitentiary where he was imprisoned.37 Garrett appealed the 
district court’s dismissal of his complaint on the ground that he failed 
to exhaust prison administrative remedies as required by 
§ 1997e(a).38 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that § 1997e makes exhaustion of administrative 
remedies mandatory, but found that a “prisoner can only exhaust 
administrative remedies that are actually available.”39 Because there 
was no administrative remedy in place that would provide monetary 
relief for Garrett, he had no available administrative remedy to 
exhaust.40 As a result, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal 
of Garrett’s claim.41 
 
 36. 127 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 37. Garrett claimed that the defendants “exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical 
needs that arose from a head injury sustained during a recreation yard fistfight . . . and that the 
unnamed defendants used excessive force in responding to the melee . . . .” This resulted in a 
shoulder injury for which he was denied treatment for two months. Id. at 1264. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1265, 1267. In reaching this finding, the court examined “whether Garrett had 
any administrative remedies available to him which he could have exhausted before proceeding 
with the present action.” Id. at 1266. The government conceded that “if an inmate seeks purely 
monetary damages . . . the institution staff will reject the claim as constituting improper subject 
matter for administrative review . . . .” Id. 
 40. Id. at 1267. 
 41. Id. 
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A year after the Tenth Circuit decided Garrett, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the same issue.42 In Whitley v. 
Hunt, the prisoner-plaintiff filed suit against the Bureau of Prisons 
and three prison officials for monetary damages.43 When a magistrate 
judge recommended dismissal for Whitley’s claims because he failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies, Whitley objected, arguing that 
because he was bringing suit for monetary damages, he was not 
required to pursue administrative remedies.44 The district court 
dismissed Whitley’s claims and he appealed.45  
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit looked to the plain 
language of § 1997e, which “requires only the exhaustion of 
‘available’ administrative remedies.”46 The court concluded that 
inclusion of the term “available” shows that Congress had no 
intention of requiring the exhaustion of remedies that are not 
available.47 The court looked to its decision in Underwood v. 
Wilson48 to examine what constitutes an available remedy.49  
Holding that there were no available administrative remedies 
capable of providing Whitley with monetary relief at the time he filed 
his complaint,50 the court adopted the rule that “federal prisoners 
 
 42. Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 884 (5th Cir. 1998). The court acknowledged in 
Whitley that the Tenth Circuit was, at that time, “the only Circuit to have directly addressed the 
issue . . . .” Id. at 886. 
 43. Whitley’s claim alleged that the prison denied him medical care, discriminated against 
him, improperly changed his security classification, and retaliated against him for filing his 
claims. Id. at 884. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 883. 
 46. Id. at 886. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 49. 158 F.3d at 886-87. In Underwood, the court looked to dictionary definitions for 
assistance in determining what remedies were available:  
Webster’s New International Dictionary defines “available” as “capable of availing; 
having sufficient power or force to achieve an end,” “such as may be availed of: 
capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose: immediately utilizable,” and “that 
is accessible or may be obtained: personally obtainable.” 
Underwood, 151 F.3d at 295 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 150 (3d 
ed. 1981)). “‘Exhaust’ is defined as ‘to take complete advantage of (legal 
remedies).’” Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 796 (3d ed. 1981)). 
 50. “Had he submitted a grievance seeking exclusively monetary relief, it is likely that the 
grievance would have been returned as improper subject matter for administrative review.” 
Whitley, 158 F.3d at 887. 
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pressing Bivens claims against federal officials need not pursue 
prison remedies when they are seeking monetary relief, and there are 
no prison remedies capable of affording such relief.”51 The court 
noted that if Congress enacted regulations allowing successful 
prisoners to recover only monetary relief from individual prison 
officials, then it could read § 1997e to require exhaustion of those 
remedies prior to suit.52 Those remedies, however, did not exist in 
Whitley’s case; thus, the court declined to interpret § 1997e in a way 
that requires exhaustion of unavailable remedies.53 Applying its 
newly adopted rule to Whitley’s claims, the court reversed dismissal 
of one claim, reasoning that he was not required to exhaust 
unavailable remedies.54 
In Wright v. Hollingsworth,55 the Fifth Circuit questioned its 
Whitley holding56 and reconsidered Wright en banc.57 When deciding 
Wright, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was bound by Whitley and 
found that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing 
Wright’s claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.58  
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Whitley’s medical care claim 
against the three individual defendants. Id. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Whitley’s other claims: his medical care claim against the Bureau of Prisons; his claim of 
discrimination against all defendants; his classification claims against all defendants; and his 
retaliation claims against all defendants, for reasons not related to the exhaustion requirement 
and its applicability to claims for monetary relief. Id. 
 55. 201 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 56. “Because the proper handling of thousands of inmate grievances annually is of vital 
interest to both the states and the federal courts, and there are strong arguments that Whitley 
may have misinterpreted the PLRA, en banc reconsideration should be undertaken.” Id. at 664. 
 57. Id. at 666. The court recognized that Whitley’s interpretation of § 1997e(a) conflicts 
with the Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts’ interpretation of § 1997e(a). Id. Therefore, 
the court urged an en banc reconsideration of its decision in Whitley “in order to reconcile this 
circuit’s interpretation of the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e with the explicit 
language and policy of the Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . .” Id. at 664.  
 58. Id. at 665-66. The court stated that an inmate seeking only monetary relief need not 
exhaust administrative remedies when the prison’s grievance procedure did not permit 
monetary damages. Id. at 666. It urged the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to reconsider 
Whitley v. Hunt en banc. Id. at 664. The court said that without en banc reconsideration, the 
state would be foreclosed from briefing and arguing the PLRA’s approach to the exhaustion 
requirement in the PLRA. Id. at 666. The court further stated that when Whitley was decided, 
the panel:  
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Rumbles v. Hill is another recent circuit court decision holding 
that prisoners seeking monetary relief are not required to exhaust 
their administrative remedies when filing civil rights actions.59 
Rumbles brought a § 1983 action for monetary damages and for 
injunctive-type relief against Hill, a prison guard.60 “The district court 
held that because California’s administrative prison grievance 
process does not allow for monetary damages, this form of relief does 
not constitute an ‘available’ remedy that must be exhausted before 
bringing a section 1983 action.”61 In affirming this conclusion, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied its decision in 
Lunsford v. Jumao-As.62 Lunsford held that prisoners with Bivens 
claims are not required to exhaust administrative remedies when all 
they seek is monetary relief and there are no administrative remedies 
capable of providing that relief.63 The Ninth Circuit found it was 
logical to extend Lunsford’s reasoning in reference to Bivens actions 
to § 1983 actions.64 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district 
court’s order denying Hill’s motion to dismiss. 
 
did not have the benefit of the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent, detailed analysis of the 
statutory changes to § 1997e occasioned by the PLRA or of two other circuit court 
decisions consistent with the Eleventh Circuit. Those cases advance strong arguments 
why requiring exhaustion of all administrative remedies (even if an inmate is seeking 
only monetary damages) is consistent with the changes made . . . by the PLRA, better 
implements the legislative purpose of the PLRA, and furthers the policies supporting 
exhaustion.  
Id.  
 59. 182 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 60. Id. Rumbles alleged that Hill spit on him, called him racial epithets, and assaulted or 
threatened to assault him. Id. at 1066. As injunctive relief, Rumbles sought an apology from 
Hill and “a federal investigation into ‘new California laws that are stiffer on repeat offenders 
and [the] effect [of such laws] on the conduct of Correctional Officers.’ . . .” Id. The district 
court held that it was powerless to investigate the state laws’ effect on correctional officers and, 
furthermore, that it could not compel a party to apologize. Id. at 1066-67.  
 61. Id. at 1067. 
 62. 155 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998). In Lunsford, the prisoner sought monetary relief in a 
Bivens action against prison officials. Id. The court held that Lunsford was not required to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit because the Bureau of Prisons’ grievance 
procedure did not provide for monetary relief, only injunctive relief. Rumbles, 182 F.3d at 
1068-69. 
 63. Id. at 1069. “‘Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the 
replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.’” Id. (quoting Van 
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 64. Id.  
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B. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits: Prisoners 
Seeking Monetary Relief are Required to Exhaust  
Administrative Remedies 
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits endorse the 
opposite side of the circuit split: they require prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies under the PLRA despite the fact that their 
claims are for monetary relief only.  
Alexander v. Hawk involved a prisoner-plaintiff who brought a 
Bivens action against prison officials in Florida.65 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the prisoner’s action stating as its reason for dismissal 
the prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required 
by the PLRA.66 The court recognized that the PLRA § 1997e(a) 
applies to both federal and state prisoners and proceeded to analyze 
the plaintiff’s argument in support of his contention that he was not 
required to exhaust administrative remedies.67 The plaintiff argued 
that because the Bureau of Prisons has no authority to award 
monetary damages, its remedies are “futile and inadequate” for his 
claim.68 Based on that information, he asserted that there were no 
administrative remedies available for him to exhaust and that 
§ 1997e(a) did not apply to his claims.69 In response to the plaintiff’s 
argument, the court first recalled its conclusion in Irwin v. Hawk,70 in 
which it held that exhaustion is required even if such an action 
 
 65. 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). Alexander, the prisoner-plaintiff, claimed that prison 
officials’ enforcement of legislation restricting prisoners’ access to magazines that are sexually 
explicit or feature nudity violates his First Amendment rights. Id. at 1322. 
 66. Id. at 1323. 
 67. Id. at 1324. The court noted that the pre-PLRA § 1997e(a) statute applied only to state 
prisoners because it addressed only § 1983 actions involving state action. Id. “However, the text 
of the current section 1997e(a) expressly provides that its exhaustion requirement applies to 
actions brought ‘under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law’ . . . . [L]egislative history 
makes clear that Congress intended PLRA section 1997e(a) to apply to both state and federal 
prisoners.” Id. at 1324. 
 68. Id. at 1325. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 40 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1994). In Irwin, the plaintiff sought not only monetary relief, 
but also injunctive relief. In deciding Irwin, the court relied on another case from earlier in 
1994, Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521 (11th Cir. 1994), which held that the district 
court did not err when it “dismissed the prisoner’s claim for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies where the prisoner sought both monetary and injunctive relief.” 159 F.3d at 1325. 
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appears futile.71 Next, the court emphasized that Plaintiff’s argument 
of futility and inadequacy did not withstand the mandatory 
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.72  
The court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that despite the 
mandatory exhaustion requirement, there is no adequate remedy and 
thus no available remedy because the Bureau of Prisons is unable to 
award monetary damages.73 The court distinguished the PLRA phrase 
“administrative remedies as are available” from “an adequate 
administrative remedy”74 and found that requiring Plaintiff to exhaust 
 
 71. Irwin, 40 F.3d at 349. 
No doubt denial is the likeliest outcome but that is not [a] sufficient reason for waiving 
the requirement of exhaustion. Lightening [sic] may strike: and even if it doesn’t, in 
denying relief the Bureau may give a statement of its reasons that is helpful to the 
district court in considering the merits of the claim.  
159 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 539, 641 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 72. Id. at 1325. “Since exhaustion is now a pre-condition to suit, the courts cannot simply 
waive those requirements where they determine they are futile or inadequate. Such an 
interpretation would impose an enormous loophole in the PLRA, which Congress clearly did 
not intend.” Id. at 1326. The court stated that a judicial conclusion that the requirement of 
exhaustion need not apply does not satisfy the mandate of exhaustion. Id. The court cites 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975) which holds that “where exhaustion is a 
statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite, ‘the requirement . . . may not be dispensed 
merely by a judicial conclusion of futility’.” Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. 159 F.3d at 1326-27. The three reasons the court offered were:  
 (1) in contrast to the pre-PLRA statute, the current § 1997e(a) does not  
condition the exhaustion requirement on the administrative remedies being “plain, 
speedy, and effective.” Instead, section 1997e(a) merely provides for exhaustion of 
“such administrative remedies as are available.”. . . The removal of the qualifiers 
“plain, speedy and effective” from the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement 
indicates that Congress no longer wanted courts to examine the effectiveness of 
administrative remedies but rather to focus solely on whether an administrative remedy 
program is “available” in the prison involved. 
Id. at 1326.  
(2) the court found that the term “available” in section 1997e(a) “is used to 
acknowledge that not all prisons actually have administrative remedy programs. Some 
state penal institutions may not have an administrative remedy program to address 
prison conditions, and thus there are no ‘available’ administrative remedies to exhaust 
. . . However, here, the BOP has an available administrative remedy program.” 
Id. at 1326-27. 
(3) other court decisions cited in Alexander that did not require a prisoner to pursue 
administrative remedies when the court determined that there was no adequate remedy 
available did not persuade the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit court here. “None 
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available administrative remedies would serve policies favoring 
exhaustion.75 For example, during the administrative grievance 
process, the Bureau of Prisons could review its actions, correct any 
mistakes, and put a stop to any infringing practice.76 A further benefit 
was the opportunity for the Bureau of Prisons to document 
information such as its justifications for the implementation of 
restrictions and regulations that the prisoner opposes.77 In its 
conclusion, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that he failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies as required by the PLRA § 1997e(a).78 
 
of these cases discusses Congress’s removal of the pre-PLRA condition that available 
remedies be ‘plain, speedy, and effective’ from section 1997e(a) . . . Since both the plain 
language and the legislative history of the PLRA support the result here, we decline to 
follow these decisions. 
Id. at 1327. 
 75. Id. Mandatory exhaustion of a prison’s administrative remedies is favorable for 
several policy reasons; the court in Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services, Inc., 
954 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1992) set out the following seven policy reasons:  
1) to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process; 2) to let the agency 
develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based; 3) to 
permit the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise; 4) to improve the 
efficiency of the administrative process; 5) to conserve the scarce judicial resources, 
since the complaining party may be successful in vindicating rights in the 
administrative process and the courts may never have to intervene; 6) to give the 
agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; and 7) to avoid the possibility 
that “frequent and deliberate flouting of the administrative processes could weaken the 
effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.” 
Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Kobleur, 954 F.2d at 712 (citations omitted)). 
 76. Id. at 1327. Being in a position to evaluate its actions and to stop any infringing 
actions gives the Bureau of Prisons the power to “freeze[] the time frame for the prisoner’s 
damages.” Id.  
 77. Id. at 1327-28. 
Even if the BOP did not grant relief, a prisoner’s resort to the administrative process is 
not futile, but allows grievances to be heard and a record to be created for review in 
any subsequent proceedings. Courts not only conserve time and effort as a result of 
any factfinding during the . . . proceedings, but also benefit from the BOP’s expertise 
in interpreting its own regulations and applying them to the facts before it. 
Id.  
 78. Id. at 1328. A year after the decision in Alexander, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the prisoner did not fail to exhaust his remedies by failing to appeal 
after the prison told him “unequivocally that appeal of an institution-level denial was 
precluded.” Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 1999). “The memorandum that 
Miller received . . . denying his grievance at the institutional level stated ‘[w]hen any grievance 
is terminated at the institutional level you do not have the right to appeal. The above listed 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/16










2002]  Prisoners Seeking Relief 433 
 
 
Several months later, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
addressed the applicability of the mandatory exhaustion requirement 
of § 1997e(a) to a prisoner’s claim for monetary relief in Wyatt v. 
Leonard.79 In Wyatt, prisoner-plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his 
civil rights action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.80 
The court acknowledged that the principal issue in the case was 
whether prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies in actions for 
damages in order to comply with § 1997e(a) of the PLRA even when 
the state’s administrative process does not provide for recovery of 
damages.81 The court held that prisoners must exhaust administrative 
remedies even when they seek only monetary damages.82  
The court acknowledged the circuit split and set forth its reasons 
why it found that prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies.83 
The court emphasized the importance of administrative review of 
prisoners’ complaints in allowing the prison administrators an 
opportunity to correct legitimate complaints.84 The court also 
 
grievance(s) is closed.’” Id. 
 79. 193 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 80. Id. at 877. Plaintiff, Wyatt, filed a “§ 1983 civil rights action against prison employees 
seeking damages for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment” 
because he was raped by another inmate. Id. He also alleged that the prison employees 
“provided inadequate medical and psychological care after the rape.” Id. 
 81. Id. at 877-78. 
 82. Id. at 879. This rule applies “if the prison system does not altogether refuse to review 
the prisoner’s allegations on which the claim is based.” Id. 
 83. Id. at 878. 
Two circuits have held in Bivens-type actions by federal prisoners that exhaustion in 
money damages cases is unnecessary because federal prison regulations do not allow 
for administrative review at all if the federal prisoner seeks damages. Whitley v. Hunt, 
158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997). On the 
other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that even where the 
federal prison system denies review in such money damages cases, the federal prisoner 
must still attempt to have his complaint reviewed. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 
1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
Id. 
 84. Id. 
Although it makes sense to excuse exhaustion of the prisoner’s complaints where the 
prison system has a flat rule declining jurisdiction over such cases, it does not make 
sense to excuse the failure to exhaust when the prison system will hear the case and 
attempt to correct legitimate complaints by providing some remedy, even though it 
will not pay damages.  
Id. 
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enumerated three reasons why the prisoner must exhaust 
administrative remedies. First, without mandatory exhaustion, 
prisoners easily could bypass the administrative process by simply 
requesting monetary relief, “a loophole the [PLRA] does not appear 
to allow.”85 Allowing prisoners to bypass the administrative process 
when seeking relief for their actions would counter one of PLRA’s 
purposes: to give prisons notice of complaints, give them the chance 
to respond to such complaints, and prevent injuries of the same sort 
from happening again.86 Second, prisoners who could avoid the 
exhaustion mandate of § 1997e(a) by asking for monetary damages 
would undermine the PLRA’s purpose of deterring frivolous 
lawsuits.87 Third, records of the administrative review process are 
helpful to federal courts “in weeding out the frivolous prisoner cases 
from the ones that may have merit so that they can concentrate on the 
latter.”88  
The above reasons and the plain language of § 1997e(a) of the 
PLRA caused the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to hold that 
prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies even when they seek 
only monetary damages.89 In this plaintiff’s case, however, the court 
held that inmate Wyatt had “substantially complied” with exhaustion 
requirements and remanded the case for reinstatement of his 
complaint.90  
Shortly after deciding Wyatt,91 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held strongly to its position on prisoner exhaustion in Lavista 
v. Beeler.92 After finding that the plain language of the amended 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 880.  
 90. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said that while Wyatt “did not follow 
precisely the requisite procedures for bringing his complaint to the attention of the appropriate 
person, he has substantially complied with the exhaustion requirement by giving written notice 
on several occasions to prison officials.” Id. 
 91. Wyatt v. Leonard was argued on August 12, 1999 and was decided and filed on 
October 6, 1999. Lavista v. Beeler was submitted on August 12, 1999 and was decided and filed 
on October 26, 1999. 
 92. 195 F.3d 254 (1999). Lavista, a federal inmate, brought claims pursuant to, Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, among others, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the First, Fifth, Sixth, 
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§ 1997e(a) and the legislative history both indicate that all prisoners, 
including federal prisoners like Lavista, are required to exhaust 
available administrative remedies before bringing a Bivens claim to 
federal court, the court addressed the plaintiff’s contention that he 
had no available remedy to exhaust because the Bureau of Prisons 
was not able to award monetary damages.93 The court explained that 
excusing a prisoner from the exhaustion requirement would be 
inefficient because a prison system would willingly hear the 
prisoner’s complaints and attempt to solve problems associated with 
the complaints, even if the system was unable to provide monetary 
damages.94 Because the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative 
remedies before filing suit in federal court, the court affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the case.95  
Citing both Wyatt v. Leonard and Lavista v. Beeler, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again reaffirmed its stance on the issue 
of § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement for a prisoner seeking 
 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. at 255. Lavista 
alleged a number of claims, including denial of medical care, sexual harassment and sexual 
assault, destruction of personal property, and retaliation during his incarceration. Id. He 
appealed the district court’s dismissal of his case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
pursuant to § 1997e(a) of the PLRA. Id. 
 93. Id. at 256. Lavista relied on McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992), which held 
that:  
federal prisoners bringing a Bivens action that sought only money damages were not 
required to exhaust the Bureau of Prisons grievance procedure . . . McCarthy 
recognized that when Congress specifically mandates exhaustion, it is required and the 
courts may not excuse the requirement. With the passage of the Reform Act, Congress 
has now specifically mandated the exhaustion of remedies through the prison 
grievance system. Even before passage of the Reform Act, this Court held that federal 
prisoners seeking injunctive relief must exhaust administrative remedies before 
coming to federal court, even if the prisoner also asserts a claim for monetary 
damages. 
Id. at 256-57. The Court found McCarthy no longer controlling because of the PLRA 
amendments. Id. 
 94. Id. at 257.  
Although it may make sense to excuse exhaustion of the prisoner’s complaint where 
the prison system has a flat rule declining jurisdiction over such cases, it does not 
make sense to excuse the failure to exhaust when the prison system will hear the case 
and attempt to correct legitimate complaints, even though it will not pay damages. 
Id. 
 95. Id. at 258. 
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monetary relief when it decided Freeman v. Francis.96 The Freeman 
court addressed several aspects of § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion 
requirement. For example, when evaluating the applicability of the 
statute to the prisoner’s claim and how it relates to his request for 
monetary damages, the court deferred to its explanations of the issue 
in its previous opinions and instructed that, on remand, the district 
court dismiss the plaintiff’s case for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.97 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit conducted its own 
analysis as to whether the court might require a prisoner to exhaust 
available administrative remedies when the relief sought is not 
available through the administrative grievance procedure in Massey 
v. Helman.98 In Massey, the court held that when a prison has an 
internal administrative grievance procedure where prisoners can 
make complaints about prison conditions, “§ 1997e(a) requires 
inmates to exhaust those procedures before bringing a prison 
conditions claim” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.99 The court noted that 
§ 1997e(a) does not contain a conditional component that the 
applicability of the statute depends on the effectiveness of the 
administrative remedy available.100 Rather, the exhaustion 
requirement is met so long as the prison has some sort of 
administrative grievance system in place.101 The statute does not 
require the prison to have in place the prisoner’s preferred remedy, 
just an available remedy.102 The court agreed with the analysis in 
 
 96. 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 97. Id. at 645. “As we explained . . . it does not make sense to excuse the failure to 
exhaust when the prison system will hear the case and attempt to correct legitimate complaints, 
even though it will not pay damages.” Id. at 643. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
repeated this statement in an unpublished opinion. See Clark v. Beebe, No. 98-1430, 1999 WL 
993979, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1999); 198 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1999); Freeman, 196 F.3d at 645. 
 98. 196 F.3d 727, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 99. Id. at 734. 
 100. Id. at 733.  
 101. Id. “[I]f a prison has an internal administrative grievance system through which a 
prisoner can seek to correct a problem, then the prisoner must utilize that administrative system 
before filing a claim under § 1983.” Id.  
 102. Id. (citing Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added)). “The potential effectiveness of an administrative response bears no relationship to the 
statutory requirement that prisoners first attempt to obtain relief through administrative 
procedures . . . . [W]hether the administrative process actually produces a result that satisfies 
the inmate is not the appropriate inquiry.” 196 F.3d at 733. 
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Alexander v. Hawk,103 concluding that the presence of the term 
“available” in § 1997e(a) acknowledges that some prisons actually do 
not have administrative remedy programs.104 Therefore, the court 
found that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies 
before filing his § 1983 claim.105  
The plaintiffs in Massey v. Helman along with several other 
inmates, brought similar and additional claims in another case filed in 
a district court in Illinois.106 The second case, also titled Massey v. 
Helman, referred to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case 
as “Massey I.”107 Massey II cites to Massey I to declare the rule “that 
 
 103. 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 104. 196 F.3d at 734; see supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 105. Id. at 734-35. Massey argued that he is identical to an imaginary prisoner 
hypothesized by Judge Easterbrook in a previous Seventh Circuit case, Perez v. Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections. Id. at 734 (quoting Perez, 182 F.3d at 538). In the hypothetical, a 
prisoner breaks his leg, claims that prisoner officials delayed setting the bone, and later, after 
the injury has healed, brings suit for cruel and unusual punishment. Id. (quoting Perez, 182 F.3d 
at 538). Judge Easterbrook remarked, “If the injury has healed by the time suit begins, nothing 
other than damages could be a ‘remedy,’ and if the administrative process cannot provide 
compensation then there is no administrative remedy to exhaust.” Id. (quoting Perez, 182 F.3d 
at 538). Massey argued that because his hernia injury had been repaired, only money could 
serve as a remedy for him. Id. He argued that there was no administrative remedy to exhaust 
because monetary damages were not available through his prison’s grievance system. Id. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit responded to Massey’s argument by saying: 
In contrast to the imaginary prisoner in Perez for whom only money would serve as a 
remedy, Massey could have availed himself of administrative remedies that may have 
resulted in the surgical repair of his hernia before he filed suit. Because Massey’s 
physical ailment lingered long past the date he filed his lawsuit, the dicta in Perez does 
not relieve him of his obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing 
his [§ 1983] claim.  
Id. The court did not speculate what its decision would have been had Massey brought suit after 
his injury had healed. 
 106. Massey v. Helman, 78 F. Supp. 2d 806, 808 (C.D. Ill., 1999).  
 107. Id. “Despite the dismissal of Massey I, Massey and Otten, along with 13 inmates . . . 
bring this 62 page amended complaint, containing many of the very same allegations as those 
asserted in Massey I.” Id.  
 In Massey II, the district court heard arguments from the plaintiffs alleging that no 
monetary damages were available from the Bureau of Prison’s grievance system and, therefore, 
the court should not require them to exhaust all available administrative remedies before 
bringing their suit to federal court. Id. at 809. Plaintiffs also argued that the Seventh Circuit 
would reject the case of Alexander v. Hawk because, as the plaintiffs argued, the Eleventh 
Circuit wrongly decided the case. Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, did not reject Alexander v. 
Hawk in its decision in Massey I. See Massey, 196 F.3d at 734. In Massey II, the court stated, 
“Plaintiffs’ prediction was not a prescient one and the future did not turn out as Plaintiffs hoped. 
In Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Eleventh 
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a prisoner must allege that he has exhausted administrative remedies, 
not that exhaustion would fail to provide money damages or other 
specific relief he seeks.”108 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the latest circuit to 
decide the issue of whether prisoners seeking only monetary damages 
must exhaust administrative remedies when there are no monetary 
damages available. In Nyhuis v. Reno,109 the court held that a prisoner 
must exhaust administrative remedies, even if the administrative 
procedure could not have provided monetary or declaratory relief.110 
The court also held that “the PLRA . . . precludes a futility exception 
to its mandatory exhaustion requirement.”111 Advancing four reasons 
why the futility exception does not apply in Nyhuis or in any case,112 
 
Circuit’s interpretation of the term ‘available’ in the PLRA.” 78 F. Supp. at 809 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 108. See Massey, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 810. The court held: 
Massey and the Inmates cannot meet their obligation to plead exhaustion by alleging 
that exhaustion is not required due to the unavailability of BOP remedies that the 
Inmates consider to be more pleasing or complete. Thus, because the inmates have 
failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies, their claims must be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim. 
Id. at 810-11. 
 109. 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 110. Id. at 78. Nyhuis brought a Bivens action alleging violations of his property rights. Id. 
at 66. He sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief without exhausting the 
administrative procedures in place at the prison where he was incarcerated. Id. He argued that 
he did not pursue administrative remedies because exhaustion would be futile “since the Bureau 
of Prisons’ administrative process could not afford the monetary or declaratory relief he 
requested.” Id. at 67-68. 
 111. Id. at 71.  
 112. Id. at 71. The court first looked to the plain language of the statute to find that 
Congress’s amendment of the statute makes it clear that the statute requires exhaustion without 
exception. Id. at 72. It also rejected the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s argument in 
Whitley over the definition of the word “available.” Id. at 72-73.  
 Second, the court discussed Congress’s intent in its passage of the PLRA to support its 
interpretation of § 1997e(a). Id. at 73-74. The court noted that allowing exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement when a prisoner seeks only monetary relief would frustrate the aim of 
the PLRA to deter frivolous lawsuits. Id.  
 Third, the court emphasized the importance of administrative review in saving the courts  
from spending countless hours, educating themselves in every case, as to the vagaries 
of prison administrative processes, state or federal. An interpretation of § 1997e(a) that 
conditioned exhaustion on whether an administrative scheme grants the relief 
requested would have the effect of making the application of § 1997e(a) dependent 
upon the peculiarities of such processes. Such an interpretation would involve federal 
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the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of his case.113 The court observed that applying the 
exhaustion requirement without exception could eventually lead to 
the development of “a cooperative ethos . . . between inmate and 
jailer,” which, in turn, could lead to an administrative process that is 
not as hostile or adversarial as a federal court.114 
IV. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL 
REQUESTS FOR MONETARY RELIEF IN PRISONERS’ CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACTIONS 
The recent Nyhuis v. Reno decision leaves four circuits that have 
not currently addressed the issue concerning the § 1997e exhaustion 
mandate on prisoners who seek only monetary relief when the 
prisoners are in a system that cannot provide monetary damages 
through administrative grievance procedures. District courts within 
these four circuits that have addressed the exhaustion issue do not 
unanimously agree that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA 
must apply where the prisoner was pursuing only monetary damages 
 
courts in the tedious and intrusive process of evaluating each prisoner’s cause of action 
and the underlying administrative scheme in each prison–something Congress was 
plainly guarding against when it enacted the PLRA.  
Id. at 74. The court adopted a bright-line rule that:  
makes things clear for inmates and insures that our time is saved for more important 
matters, as Congress intended. Our bright line rule is that inmate-plaintiffs must 
exhaust all available administrative remedies. Under such an approach, federal courts 
need not waste their time evaluating whether those remedies provide the federal 
prisoner with the relief he desires.  
Id. at 75 (citation omitted). 
 Finally, the court argued that its holding is supported by the policies underlying exhaustion 
requirements. Id. The court described three such policies:  
(1) avoiding premature interruption of the administrative process and giving the 
agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; (2) conserving scarce judicial 
resources, since the complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in 
the administrative process and the courts may never have to intervene; and (3) 
improving the efficacy of the administrative process. 
Id. Additionally, the court noted that “[a]n across-the-board exhaustion requirement also 
promotes judicial efficiency” and “the efficacy of the administrative process itself.” Id. at 76.  
 113. Id. at 66-67.  
 114. Id. at 77. 
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and the prison grievance procedure did not provide for monetary 
relief.115 Therefore, if those circuits eventually address the issue, they 
will do so without the guidance of a clear preference among their 
district courts. 
The circuit courts agreed, even before the enactment of the PLRA, 
that when prisoners seek both injunctive and monetary relief, the 
prisoners must meet the exhaustion requirement before bringing suit 
in federal court.116 The reason for this policy is that the prison 
administration is ideally situated to grant injunctive relief for 
prisoners’ complaints.117 A debate arises when a plaintiff who asserts 
claims for both injunctive and monetary relief is compared to the 
plaintiff who brings a similar claim for only monetary damages. The 
question is whether it is fair to require the former plaintiff to exhaust 
administrative remedies while allowing the latter plaintiff to bypass 
the exhaustion requirement and bring his claim immediately to 
federal court.118 Under § 1997e, there is tension between easing the 
courts’ burden from prisoner suits and requiring prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies that may not be adequate. As the courts that 
faced the issue of prisoner exhaustion of available administrative 
remedies have noted, however, the language of § 1997e(a) indicates 
neither a quality standard for remedies nor that the remedies be 
adequate.119 Courts debate over what constitutes “available.” Some 
 
 115. See, e.g., Hall v. McCoy, 89 F. Supp.2d 742, 747 (W.D. Va. 2000) (noting that the 
Fourth Circuit has not considered this issue, the court dismissed case after plaintiff seeking only 
monetary damages failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to § 1997e(a)); Cruz 
v. Jordan, 80 F. Supp.2d 109, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (staying an action pending exhaustion of 
available administrative remedies stating “[t]here is much to be gained by requiring a plaintiff 
to exhaust available administrative procedures even where the remedies provided by those 
procedures are not identical with the remedies sought in a judicial proceeding.”), reconsidered 
in Cruz v. Jordan, 80 F. Supp.2d 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (deciding that the administrative 
remedies offered could serve no practical purpose for the plaintiff and, therefore, were not 
“available” administrative remedy under the PLRA and prisoner’s case may proceed); Murphy 
v. Magnusson, No. CIV.98-439-P-C, 1999 WL 615895 at *2 (D.Me.) (plaintiff seeking 
monetary, injunctive and declaratory relief must exhaust administrative procedures); Beeson v. 
Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp.2d 884, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Congress, in enacting the 
PLRA, applied the exhaustion requirement to all actions brought by prisoners with respect to 
prison conditions . . . regardless of what relief is sought.”). 
 116. Pollack, supra note 11, at 256. 
 117. Id. at 256. 
 118. Id. at 256-57. 
 119. Again, all that the language of § 1997e(a) indicates is “. . . until such administrative 
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opinions hold that the inability to give prisoners monetary relief does 
not qualify as an available remedy for purposes of § 1997e.120 Other 
opinions hold that the inability to give prisoners monetary relief does 
not interfere with a requirement that prisoners must exhaust the 
administrative remedies that are available.121 The circuits that agree 
with the latter viewpoint examine the important policy reasons that 
underlie the exhaustion doctrine. 
Policy reasons for requiring the exhaustion doctrine were neatly 
presented in Wyatt v. Leonard.122 First, without an exhaustion 
doctrine for prison condition cases seeking monetary relief, prisoners 
who wanted to avoid the administrative process could simply ask for 
damages.123 This is not a scenario that § 1997e(a) appears to allow. 
Second, the purpose of the PLRA is to deter frivolous lawsuits.124 If a 
prisoner can take a frivolous lawsuit directly to federal court by 
asking only for monetary damages, then the purpose of the PLRA is 
undermined.125 Additionally, requiring a prisoner with a prison 
conditions complaint to work through the available administrative 
remedies prompts administrators to review the conditions and the 
 
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
 120. For a general discussion of particular cases, see supra Part III.  
 121. For a general discussion of particular cases, see supra Part III. 
 122. Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878-79. An administrative grievance procedure is beneficial in a 
number of ways:  
It alerts staff to problem areas in the institution. It spotlights those matters that are of 
greatest inmate concern. It may point out an individual officer or an isolated activity 
where corrective action may be needed. It serves, when run properly, to diffuse inmate 
resentment and hostility. It often lessens the number of lawsuits that are filed. When 
lawsuits are filed, it provides a quick record to attorneys and to the courts of what has 
been done already to address the complaint. It may provide a statistical basis, either 
grossly or precisely, to assess programs, policies, or activities that need more careful 
review and possible revision. It gives the corrections agency the chance to address its 
problems of management and operation and to correct them internally, without having 
the courts step in and order corrective action of the courts’ preference. 
CRIPE, supra note 29 at 78. 
 Potential weaknesses of a grievance system are: (1) that money damages usually are not 
provided; (2) that injunctive relief usually is applied only in cases with an ongoing problem; (3) 
and that response to inmates’ grievances may take longer time than expected. Id. 
 123. Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
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claims and creates a record of the situation. When the administrative 
process fails to relieve a prisoner’s claims, then the federal court who 
receives the prisoner’s case will have a record of the situation to 
review in order to determine whether or not the case has merit.  
The circuit courts remark that prisoners who seek only monetary 
relief are frustrated while working their way through a process that 
they foresee as providing them no benefit at all.126 Yet, if the 
grievance procedures in place were to include money as an available 
remedy, the courts that are now opposed to the exhaustion 
requirement in cases where a prisoner seeks only monetary relief are 
likely to mandate that the prisoner exhaust the remedies.127 Certainly, 
the courts cannot dictate that all prison grievance procedures include 
an option for monetary damages. Congress would have included such 
an option as part of the amendments of the PLRA. Nothing in the 
language of § 1997e suggests that Congress requires monetary 
damages to be available within administrative grievance 
procedures.128 If all prisons do adopt a grievance procedure that 
includes monetary relief as one of its options, the circuits will likely 
resolve the split in their assessment of this issue. 
While monetary relief is not an available administrative remedy in 
many prison administrative systems, the policy reasons behind the 
exhaustion requirement are more substantive and foundational than 
the policy reasons for allowing a prisoner to bypass the exhaustion 
requirement when the prisoner seeks only monetary relief.129 
Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies furthers the intent of 
Congress when it enacted the PLRA, and it does not preclude 
prisoners who are denied relief by the prison to take their claims to 
federal court.130 
Congress’ intent in requiring the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies was to drastically reduce the suits in federal courts brought 
by prisoners. Thus, allowing certain prisoners to bypass the 
exhaustion requirement by asking for monetary relief would run 
 
 126. See supra Part III.A. 
 127. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996). 
 129. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. II 1996).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/16










2002]  Prisoners Seeking Relief 443 
 
 
counter to congressional intent. If prisoners are allowed to bypass the 
requirement as easily as it seems, then a reduction in prisoner 
lawsuits will not happen. 
Even if the § 1997e exhaustion requirement is adopted as applying 
to all claims, whether they seek only monetary damages or not, there 
may still be debate over the interpretation of the term “available” in 
§ 1997e. Some courts may interpret “available” to mean that any type 
of remedy in place will satisfy the definition, while other courts may 
interpret the word to mean “effective” for that particular prisoner’s 
claim. A case by case interpretation of what “available” means will 
lead to results as incongruous as the example discussed at the 
beginning of this Note. A bright-line rule, like the rule in Nyhuis, will 
be the most efficient way to administer § 1997e(a)’s mandate.131 As 
the court in Nyhuis held, a bright-line rule will give prisoners 
certainty about how their claims will be treated.132 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the recent ruling in Nyhuis, a majority of the circuits that 
have addressed the debated issue of the exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1997e and its application to claims for only monetary damages now 
endorse the position that § 1997e(a) applies to all civil rights claims, 
even where the administrative procedures in place do not provide for 
monetary damages. Of the three remaining circuits that still hold that 
§ 1997e’s exhaustion requirement should not apply when a prisoner 
seeks only monetary relief and his prison grievance system does not 
provide for monetary damages, the Fifth Circuit133 appears to be on 
the verge of reconsidering its position. The strong policy reasons for 
requiring § 1997e to apply to all prisoner civil rights actions, despite 
the remedy sought, give courts good reason to rule in favor of 
mandatory exhaustion for all prisoners’ civil rights claims. With 
consistent application of § 1997e to all claims, the administrative 
procedures will reduce the amount of cases that make their way to 
federal court, which is exactly why Congress enacted the PLRA. The 
 
 131. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 132. Id.  
 133. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 201 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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claims that then make it to federal court will be meritorious and could 
not be settled within the administrative system; this is the process 
hoped for by the PLRA. 
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